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Abstract
We develop an assignment theory to analyze the volume and composition of foreign
direct investment (FDI). Firms conduct FDI by either engaging in greenﬁeld investment or
in cross-border acquisitions. Cross-border acquisitions involve ﬁrms trading heterogeneous
corporate assets to exploit complementarities, while greenﬁeld FDI involves building a new
plant in the foreign market. In equilibrium, greenﬁeld FDI and cross-border acquisitions
co-exist, but the composition of FDI between these modes varies with ﬁrm and country
characteristics. Firms engaging in greenﬁeld investment are systematically more eﬃcient
than those engaging in cross-border acquisitions. Furthermore, most FDI takes the form of
cross-border acquisitions when factor price diﬀerences between countries are small, while
greenﬁeld investment plays a more important role for FDI from high-wage into low-wage
countries. These results capture important features of the data.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) play a dominant role in an increasingly globalized world.
In 1999, the domestic operations of the approximately 2,400 U.S. multinational enterprises
accounted for approximately 26 percent of U.S. GDP, 63 percent of U.S. exports, 37 percent
of U.S. imports, and 68 percent of U.S. R&D expenditures (Mataloni and Yorganson, 2002).
That year, nearly half of all U.S. manufacturing workers were employed by U.S. multinationals.
Despite their economic importance, the investment decisions of multinationals are not yet
well understood. With few exceptions, the trade literature has not distinguished between
the two modes in which a multinational enterprise can engage in foreign direct investment
(FDI): cross-border acquisition (entering a foreign market by buying an existing enterprise)
and greenﬁeld FDI (entering a foreign market by building a new enterprise). Consequently,
the literature has been preoccupied with understanding the volume of FDI, neglecting its
composition across modes.
To the extent that MNEs do not view cross-border acquisitions and greenﬁeld FDI as perfect
substitutes, economists and policy makers should care not only about the volume of FDI, but
also about its composition. Indeed, governments of many host countries perceive cross-border
acquisitions as being rather diﬀerent from greenﬁeld FDI.1 Any change in policies towards FDI
and any variation in country characteristics is likely to aﬀect cross-border acquisitions and
greenﬁeld FDI diﬀerently. Therefore, the volume of FDI cannot fully be understood without
ﬁrst understanding its composition.
If our hypothesis that cross-border acquisitions and greenﬁeld FDI are not perfect substi-
tutes is correct, then this should show up in the data: there should be systematic diﬀerences
in FDI mode choice across MNEs. Indeed, if the two FDI modes were perfect substitutes, then
all ﬁrms would be indiﬀerent between the two modes, and so there should be no systematic
v a r i a t i o ni nm o d ec h o i c ea c r o s sﬁrms within the same industry. In ﬁgure 1, we explore the
relationship between a U.S. multinational’s eﬃciency and its propensity to favor cross-border
acquisitions over greenﬁeld FDI. This ﬁgure is constructed using data from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) on outward FDI of U.S. multinational enterprises over the period
1994-1998. From this dataset, we construct two measures of a U.S. multinational’s eﬃciency:
(i) the parent company’s sales in the U.S. (relative to its industry mean),2 and (ii) the parent
company’s value added per worker in the U.S. (relative to its industry mean). Based on each
measure of ﬁrm eﬃciency, we sort MNE’s into three equally-sized bins: “low”, “medium”, and
“high” eﬃciency. The ﬁgure reveals that ﬁrms are less likely to choose cross-border acquisitions
over greenﬁeld FDI the more eﬃcient they are.3 The fact that FDI mode choice varies system-
atically with ﬁrm characteristics shows that cross-border acquisitions and greenﬁeld FDI are
not perfect substitutes.
FDI mode choice varies not only across ﬁrms, but also across host countries with diﬀerent
1See, for example, United Nations Center for Transnational Corporations (2000, p. xxiii).
2Most models of ﬁrm heterogeneity predict a monotonic relationship between ﬁrm eﬃciency and sales.
3As the econometric analyis in the appendix shows, this relationship is robust to including various control
variables that might aﬀect FDI mode choice. Additional information concerning the construction of the data is
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Figure 2: The Share of Cross-Border Acquisitions in Total U.S. Outward FDI by the Host
Country’s Level of DevelopmentAn Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 3
levels of development. In ﬁgure 2, we explore the relationship between a host country’s level
of development, as measured by GDP per capita and the average wage rate, and the fraction
of U.S. multinationals that enter this country through cross-border acquisition rather than
greenﬁeld FDI. As the ﬁgure reveals, U.S. multinationals are more likely to favor cross-border
acquisition over greenﬁeld FDI, the more developed is the host country. Interestingly, more
than sixty percent of U.S. outward FDI is directed towards the group of countries with the
highest level of development, which is also the group with the highest fraction of cross-border
acquisition in total FDI. This suggests that an understanding of the composition of FDI across
modes will provide us with a deeper understanding of the volume of FDI.4
In this paper, we develop an assignment theory of foreign direct investment to explain
multinationals’ FDI mode choice. According to much of the business literature, acquisitions
allow ﬁrms to exploit complementarities in their ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets. This view of mergers and
acquisitions is in line with the fact that approximately half of all mergers and acquisitions in
the U.S. involve trade in individual plants and divisions rather than entire corporations; see
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001).5 These observations show that ﬁrms are in the business of
buying and selling corporate assets, and that these assets are heterogeneous and complementary.
Indeed, as Caves (1998; p. 1963) points out:
“For the reshuﬄing of plants (or lines of business) among ﬁrms to be productive,
there must be sources of heterogeneity. [...] These heterogeneities cause assets’
productivities to vary substantially depending on the other business assets with
which they collaborate within the ﬁrm.”
We therefore model the merger market as a market in which heterogeneous ﬁrms buy and
sell heterogeneous ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets to exploit complementarities. The equilibrium of the
merger market is the solution of the associated assignment problem: which ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets
should optimally be combined?
In our model, a cross-border acquisition involves purchasing foreign corporate assets that
the acquirer lacks. Greenﬁeld FDI, on the other hand, involves building production capacity
in the foreign country to allow the ﬁrm to deploy its corporate assets abroad. There are two
countries that can freely trade with one another. Motivated by our empirical ﬁnding that
the host country’s level of development is an important determinant of FDI mode choice, we
assume that countries diﬀer in factor prices and in the distributions of entrepreneurial abilities
(or some other corporate assets). Factor price diﬀerences give rise to greenﬁeld FDI (from the
high cost to the low cost country) and to cross-border acquisitions (from each country to the
other). Cross-country diﬀerences in entrepreneurial abilities, however, give rise only to cross-
border acquisitions (from each country to the other). Our model thus generates (potentially
large) two-way FDI ﬂows even in the absence of transport costs and factor price diﬀerences
between countries.
In our model, greenﬁeld FDI and cross-border acquisitions co-exist. However, as factor
price diﬀerences become small, almost all FDI takes the form of cross-border acquisitions. This
4See the appendix for an econometric analysis and a description of the data.
5As Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2004) document, more than sixty percent of U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms
add or delete entire four-digit product lines within ﬁve years.An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 4
prediction is consistent with ﬁgure 2 since factor price diﬀerences between the U.S. and rich,
developed countries are arguably much smaller than between the U.S. and poor, developing
countries. We also show that the propensity of ﬁrms in the high-cost country to engage in
cross-border acquisitions rather than greenﬁeld FDI is decreasing in the relative supply of
corporate assets in the low-wage country. To the extent that poor, developing countries have
fewer attractive corporate assets than rich, developed countries, this result is also consistent
with ﬁgure 2.
Another prediction of our model is that ﬁrms engaging in greenﬁeld FDI are, on average,
more eﬃcient than those engaging in cross-border acquisitions. This is consistent with the data
summarized in ﬁgure 1. The intuition for this result may be summarized as follows. Greenﬁeld
FDI necessitates the expense of building a new plant in the foreign country, and such an expense
is worthwhile only if the gains from relocating production are suﬃciently large. Hence, only
suﬃciently productive ﬁrms will engage in greenﬁeld FDI. In contrast, the market for corporate
assets allows even relatively ineﬃcient ﬁrms to exploit complementarities.
In our model, foreign direct investment has important implications for aggregate produc-
tivity. The existence of an international market for corporate assets allows for a more eﬃcient
global assignment of ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets. However, while the re-assignment of corporate assets
improves the distribution of ﬁrm eﬃciencies in the low cost country, it has the opposite eﬀect
in the high cost country.
Related literature. Our paper is mainly related to two strands in the theoretical trade
literature. A feature common to both strands, and shared by our paper, is the assumption that
contracting problems prevent arm’s-length relationships.6
In our model, FDI arises because of underlying diﬀerences across countries, not because of
transport costs, and there is a tendency for each ﬁrm to locate production in only one country. It
is this feature that our paper shares with the literature on “vertical FDI” (e.g., Helpman, 1984,
and Neary, 2004). Indeed, recent empirical work by Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2003)
documents a tendency for multinationals to concentrate production in low-wage countries.
None of the papers on vertical FDI consider FDI mode choice. In Helpman (1984), there is
only greenﬁeld FDI, while in Neary (2004), there are only cross-border acquisitions (motivated
by market power).
Our paper is also related to the recent and growing literature on ﬁrm heterogeneity which
is concerned with the selection of heterogeneous ﬁrms into diﬀerent modes of serving global
markets. We extend this literature by introducing an international merger market. Within
this literature, the two papers that are most closely related to ours are Helpman, Melitz, and
Yeaple (2004), and Nocke and Yeaple (2004).7 However, in Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004)
there is no motive for ﬁrms to engage in cross-border acquisitions, and so greenﬁeld is the only
mode of FDI. On the other hand, Nocke and Yeaple (2004) consider cross-border acquisitions
6There is, however, an interesting recent (but so far empirically untested) literature that explores the trade-
oﬀs between in-house production and outsourcing; see Antras (2003), Antras and Helpman (2004), and Grossman
and Helpman (2004).
7Other papers in the literature on ﬁrm heterogeneity include Melitz (2003), Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and
Kortum (2003), and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004).An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 5
but analyze the interaction between trade costs (which are absent in the present model) and
the source of ﬁrm heterogeneity (mobile versus non-mobile capabilities). In the present paper,
we are able to analyze general heterogeneity in all corporate assets, which is precluded by the
presence of trade costs in Nocke and Yeaple (2004). Another beneﬁt of abstracting from trade
costs in the present paper is that it allows us to analyze large country diﬀerences.8
Plan of the paper. In the next section, we present the model. Then, in section 3, we derive
the equilibrium assignment of corporate assets and the equilibrium location of production.
Further, we explore the implications of the assignment for the distribution of ﬁrm eﬃciencies
across countries. In section 4, we solve for the FDI ﬂows implied by the equilibrium assignment
and location decisions. We show that greenﬁeld FDI and cross-border acquisitions co-exist
but that, in the limit as factor price diﬀerences vanish, all FDI takes the form of cross-border
acquisitions. Next, in section 5, we analyze the link between ﬁrm characteristics and FDI mode
choice. We show that ﬁrms engaging in greenﬁeld FDI are systematically more eﬃcient than
those engaging in cross-border acquisitions. Then, in section 6, we investigate the relationship
between country and industry characteristics on the one hand, and the composition of foreign
direct investment on the other. Finally, we conclude in section 7.
2T h e M o d e l
We consider a model of the world economy. There are two countries, 1 and 2, indexed by i,
that can freely trade with one another. There are no transport costs or tariﬀs, and so the price
of each good is the same in both countries.
Consumers. The world is populated by a unit mass of consumers with identical CES










where x(ζ) is the consumption of variety ζ, m(ζ) is the variety-speciﬁcm a s sa p p e a l ,a n dy
the consumption of the homogeneous good.9 We assume that the representative consumer’s
income is suﬃciently large so that, in equilibrium, she will consume a positive quantity of the
homogeneous good.
Firms. A ﬁrm is deﬁned as a triplet (e a,m,i), consisting of one (unique) entrepreneur of
ability e a, a (unique) variety of mass appeal m, and a plant to produce that variety in country
i.E a c h ﬁrm can produce (at most) one variety, using entrepreneurial ability e a and labor.
An entrepreneur’s ability e a may be thought of as productivity-enhancing headquarter services
that can be provided independently of the location of production but only within the ﬁrm.
8While not concerned with FDI, Antras, Garicano and Ross-Hansberg (2004) analyze a model of the assign-
ment of heterogeneous agents into international teams.
9The variety-speciﬁcm a s sa p p e a lm(ζ) should not be confused with intrinsic quality. What we have in mind
here is, rather, perceived quality after adjusting for input intensity: a Hyundai arguably is a lower-quality car
than a Rolls-Royce but it is considerably cheaper to produce and, therefore, has a greater market share. For
expositional simplicity, we abstract from variety-speciﬁc input requirements.An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 6
In particular, ﬁrm (e a,m,i) can produce any one unit of its variety using 1/e a units of labor in
country i. Hence, the ﬁrm’s unit cost of production is given by ωi/e a,w h e r eωi denotes the wage
rate in country i. For notational convenience, it will be helpful to use the following (monotone)
transform of the entrepreneur’s ability: a ≡ e aσ−1.
Ap l a n ti sv a r i e t y - s p e c i ﬁc in the sense that it must be designed for a speciﬁc variety; it has
zero value in any other usage. Building a (variety-speciﬁc) plant in country i requires φ units
of labor from country i.
Countries. In each country, producers of the diﬀerentiated product face a perfectly elastic
supply of labor. The wage rate in country 1 is higher than that in country 2, ω1 >ω 2.T h i s
assumption can be derived as an equilibrium outcome in a general equilibrium model, where
the homogeneous good is produced in both countries by perfectly competitive ﬁrms using labor,
and ﬁrms in country 1 use a more eﬃcient technology in the production of the homogeneous
good than ﬁrms in country 2.10 For notational convenience, we normalize the wage in country
2t oo n e ,ω2 ≡ 1.
In country i,t h e r ei sam a s sEi of atomless producers of the diﬀerentiated good. Each ﬁrm
in country i is endowed with (i) an entrepreneur, (ii) property rights over a unique variety,
and (iii) a plant to produce that variety in country i. Entrepreneurs and varieties are in ﬁxed
supply.
In each country, the empirical distribution function of the varieties’ mass appeal m in
the endowments of the population of ﬁrms is H. We allow for cross-country diﬀerences in
the distribution of endowments with entrepreneurial abilities. In country i, the empirical
distribution function of entrepreneurial ability a in the endowments of the population of ﬁrms
is Gi. The world distribution of entrepreneurial ability is then G ≡ (E1G1 +E2G2)/(E1 +E2).
All distribution functions are continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing on[0,∞).T h e
associated density functions are denoted by h, gi,a n dg, respectively. Our formulation does not
require us to make any further assumption on the joint distribution of m and a across ﬁrms.
Merger market. There exists a perfectly competitive global market for corporate assets in
which entrepreneurs (ﬁrms) can buy and sell varieties and the associated variety-speciﬁcp l a n t s .
Let Wi(m) denote the market price of a variety originating in country i (and its associated
plant in country i), and V (a) the shadow value of an entrepreneur with ability a.
Foreign direct investment. There are two modes of foreign direct investment: greenﬁeld FDI
and cross-border acquisition. A ﬁrm (or entrepreneur) from country i engages in greenﬁeld FDI
if (i) it manages a variety that originated in country i, and (ii) builds a new plant for that
v a r i e t yi nc o u n t r yj 6= i.11 Note, however, that a ﬁrm engaging in greenﬁeld FDI may not
necessarily produce the variety with which it was initially endowed (as the ﬁrm may have
acquired the variety from some other domestic ﬁrm). A ﬁrm (or entrepreneur) from country
i engages in a cross-border acquisition if it acquires a variety (and its associated plant) in the
other country j.
10Equivalently, we could assume that there are no wage diﬀerences, but workers in country 2 are more pro-
ductive than those in country 1 when producing the diﬀerentiated good.
11A ﬁrm that has conducted greenﬁeld FDI will have a variety-speciﬁc plant in both countries, but — since
product markets are perfectly integrated — will only produce in one of them, namely in the plant located in the
low-wage country 2.An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 7
3 Equilibrium Assignment
In this section, we turn to the equilibrium analysis of our model. We ﬁrst derive ﬁrms’ equilib-
rium proﬁt as a function of its assets. We then study (1) the merger market equilibrium, which
implies an assignment of abilities to varieties, and (2) the equilibrium location of production.
Preliminaries. Solving the representative consumer’s utility maximization problem, we





where p(ζ) is the price of variety ζ.
Proﬁt maximization implies that each ﬁrm charges a ﬁxed markup, and so the price of
variety ζ, when produced in country i,i sg i v e nb yp(ζ)=ci(ζ)/ρ,w h e r eci(ζ) is the unit cost
of production. Hence, the gross proﬁto faﬁrm producing variety ζ in country i is given by
Sm(ζ)ci(ζ)1−σ,









Writing gross proﬁts as a function of entrepreneurial ability a,m a s sa p p e a lm, demand level
S, and location of production i,w eh a v e :
Πi(a,m)=
½
θSam for i =1 ,
Sam for i =2 ,
(3)
where θ ≡ ω1−σ
1 < 1. The parameter θ captures the cost disadvantage of producing in country
1. Observe that the proﬁt function is supermodular in a and m,r e ﬂecting that entrepreneurial
ability and the variety’s mass appeal are complementary in generating proﬁt s .N o t ea l s ot h a ta
ﬁrm with an entrepreneur of ability a could generate the same proﬁt when producing a variety
of mass appeal m in country 1 and when producing a variety of mass appeal θm in country 2.
Equilibrium assignment and location of production. Equilibrium in the merger market in-
duces an assignment of entrepreneurs to varieties. We now investigate this equilibrium assign-
ment, and the equilibrium location of production, holding ﬁxed the markup-adjusted residual
demand level S. For the equilibrium assignment, the country of origin of an entrepreneur is
irrelevant: an entrepreneur can manage production (provide headquarter services) equally well
in both countries, independently of his country of origin. Since ﬁrms are proﬁt-maximizers
and the merger market is perfectly competitive, equilibrium must have the property that the
assignment of entrepreneurs to varieties and the location of production maximize ﬁrms’ joint
proﬁts, holding S ﬁxed.
We ﬁrst consider the equilibrium location of production of a variety of mass appeal m.T w o
immediate observations can be made. First, no variety that originated in country 2 will beAn Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 8
produced in country 1. To see this, note that no ﬁrm would want to move production from
a low-cost location to a high-cost location, given that there is a global pool of entrepreneurs.
Second, there must exist a threshold m ≤∞such that a variety of mass appeal m that
originated in country 1 will be produced in country 2 (incurring a ﬁxed cost φ of building a
new variety-speciﬁcp l a n t )i fm>m, and in country 1 if m<m.12
We now turn to the equilibrium assignment of entrepreneurs to varieties. Let ai(m) denote
the set of abilities of entrepreneurs who will manage a variety of mass appeal m originating in
country i, for any given (endogenous) threshold m. It is straightforward to show that a2(·) is
a strictly increasing function: there is positive assortative matching between entrepreneurial
ability and the mass appeal of a variety. This follows from three observations. First, the proﬁt
function Π2(a,m) is supermodular in a and m. Second, Gi and H are strictly increasing and
continuous distribution functions. Third, all varieties originating in country 2 will be produced
in country 2.
From the proﬁt function (3) and the location of production, we obtain two no-arbitrage
conditions that link a1(·) and a2(·). All varieties of mass appeal m<m will be produced in
their country of origin, and an entrepreneur of ability a makes the same proﬁt when managing
a variety of mass appeal m in country 1 and when managing a variety of mass appeal θm in
country 2. Hence,
a1(m)=a2(θm) for all m<m.( 4 )
All varieties of mass appeal m>m will be produced in country 2, independently of their
country of origin. Hence,
a1(m)=a2(m) for all m>m.( 5 )
An immediate implication of equation (4) is that the threshold m must be ﬁnite.13 From
the no-arbitrage conditions (4) and (5), it follows that a1(m) is single-valued and strictly
increasing in m for m<m and for m>m. Further, a1(m) has two elements, namely a2(θm)
and a2(m).S i n c ea2(θm) <a 2(m),i tf o l l o w st h a ta1(·) has an upward jump at m in the sense
that limm↑m a1(m) < limm↓m a1(m).
We are now in the position to derive ai(·). In light of the no-arbitrage conditions (4) and
(5), which link a1(·) and a2(·),w ew i l lf o c u so na2(·).F i r s t , w e d e r i v e a2(m) for m>m.
Since all varieties of mass appeal m>m will be produced in country 2, independently of their
country of origin, and since there is positive assortative matching between a and m,w eh a v e
(E1 + E2)[1− G(a2(m))] = (E1 + E2)[1− H(m)] for m ≥ m,








0 originated in country 1, and ﬁrm (a
0,m
0) locates production in country 1, while ﬁrm
(a
00,m




00] − φ.H o w -
ever, this allocation does not maximize joint proﬁts. If the better of the two entrepreneurs, max{a
0,a
00},
purchases the more popular variety m
0 and locates production in country 2, while the other entrepreneur
purchases variety m




00 +m a x {a
0,a
00}m
0] − φ, which is greater than the joint proﬁt in the candidate equilibrium.
13To see this, suppose otherwise that no ﬁrm from country 1 builds a new plant in country 2, m = ∞. However,
for m suﬃciently large, ﬁrm (a1(m),m,1) could then make a larger proﬁt by building a new plant in country 2:
Π1(a1(m),m)=Π1(a2(θm),m) < Π2(a2(θm),m) − φ. A contradiction.An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 9
where G ≡ [E1G1 + E2G2]/(E1 + E2) is the global distribution function of entrepreneurial
abilities. The term on the l.h.s. represents the mass of entrepreneurs with ability of at least
a2(m), while on the r.h.s. is the mass of varieties of mass appeal m and greater. Solving for
a2(m),y i e l d s
a2(m)=G−1 (H(m)) for m ≥ m. (6)
Next, we derive a2(m) for θm ≤ m ≤ m. From the no-arbitrage condition (4), a1(m)=
a2(θm) for m<m. Hence, all entrepreneurs of ability a2(θm) ≤ a ≤ a2(m) will manage
production in country 2, independently of their country of origin. We thus have
(E1 + E2)[G(a2(m)) − G(a2(m))] = E2 [H(m) − H(m)] for m ∈ [θm,m].






for m ∈ [θm,m]. (7)
Finally, we derive a2(m) for m<θ m.W eh a v e
(E1 + E2)G(a2(m)) = E1H(m/θ)+E2H(m) for m<θ m.
The term on the l.h.s. represents the mass of entrepreneurs from both countries who have
ability less than or equal to a2(m). The second term on the r.h.s. is the mass of varieties of
mass appeal m or less that locate (and originate) in country 2. Since a2(m)=a1(m/θ),t h e
ﬁrst term on the r.h.s. represents the mass of varieties that locate (and originate) in country
1 and that are managed, in equilibrium, by entrepreneurs of ability a2(m) or less. Solving the






for m ≤ θm. (8)
Summarizing, the function a2(·) is deﬁned, over the relevant domains, by equations (6),
(7), and (8). The function is strictly increasing, continuous, and diﬀerentiable except at θm
and m. Observe also that a2(·) depends on m; we will later analyze how this function changes
with m.
The equilibrium assignment of entrepreneurs to varieties originating in country 1, summa-









G−1 (H(m)) for m>m.
. (9)
Hence, a1(·) is a strictly increasing and diﬀerentiable function, except at m, where it exhibits
an upward jump.
Equilibrium price schedules. Having analyzed the equilibrium assignment and location of
production (as a function of S), we can now determine the equilibrium price schedules forAn Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 10
varieties and entrepreneurs on the international merger market, for any given markup-adjusted
residual demand level S.
The return of an entrepreneur of ability a2(m) is the diﬀerence between the ﬁrm’s gross
proﬁt and the equilibrium price of variety m,i . e . ,
V (a2(m)) = Π2(a2(m),m) − W2(m). (10)
In a competitive equilibrium of the market for corporate assets, an entrepreneur of type a2(m)
maximizes his value by purchasing a variety of mass appeal m in country 2, i.e.,
V (a2(m)) = max
m0 Π2(a2(m),m 0) − W2(m0).






Next, note that the market values of the worst varieties and entrepreneurs must be zero, i.e.,
W2(0) = 0 and V (a2(0)) = V (0) = 0,s i n c eΠ2(a2(0),0) = 0. Integrating equation (11), we















where the second equality follows from Π2(a2(m),m)=Sa2(m)m. Using (10), we can then
write the (shadow) value of an entrepreneur of ability a2(m) as








Consider now the equilibrium price schedule for varieties created in country 1. From the
no-arbitrage condition (4), a variety of mass appeal m<m from country 1 generates the same
proﬁta sav a r i e t yo fm a s sa p p e a lθm from country 2. Hence,
W1(m)=W2(θm) for m ≤ m. (13)
Furthermore, we obtain
W1(m)=W2(m) − φ for m ≥ m (14)
since, in equilibrium, the production of all varieties of mass appeal m>m will be located in
country 2, which requires incurring the ﬁxed cost φ.
From equations (13) and (14), it follows that
W2(θm)=W2(m) − φ. (15)An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 11
Consider a variety of mass appeal m originating in country 1. If this variety is produced in
country 1, it will be managed by an entrepreneur of ability a2(θm), and its value is thus W2(θm).
On the other hand, if this variety is produced in country 2, a new variety-speciﬁcp l a n tn e e d s
to be built in that country (at cost φ), and production will be managed by an entrepreneur of
ability a2(m). Hence, in this case, the value of the variety is W2(m) − φ.B yd e ﬁnition of m,
the two usages of the variety must generate the same value, W2(θm)=W2(m) − φ.




a2(m)dm = φ. (16)
The l.h.s. of this equation is the proﬁt increase from a relocation of production of a variety of
mass appeal m (originating in country 1) to country 2, taking into account that the equilibrium
assignment of entrepreneurs to varieties depends on the location of production. From the
viewpoint of maximizing proﬁts (holding S ﬁxed), moving variety m from country 1 to country
2 implies that an entrepreneur of ability a2(θm) is freed up in country 1 to manage production
of variety θm in country 2, which in turn allows a re-assignment of entrepreneurs to varieties
in country 2: all varieties of mass appeal between θm and m will now be managed by more
able entrepreneurs, which generates additional proﬁt. On the r.h.s. of equation (16) is the cost
of such a relocation of production.
The markup-adjusted residual demand level. So far, we have derived the equilibrium assign-
ment and location of production for a given markup-adjust residual demand level S.H o w e v e r ,
S is endogenous and determined jointly with the (endogenous) threshold m.F r o m e q u a t i o n
(2) and the equilibrium assignment of entrepreneurs to varieties derived above, the markup-
















Combining this equation with the equilibrium condition for m, equation (16), we can write
the equilibrium threshold m as a function of the exogenous variables θ, σ, φ, ω2, E1,and E2



















It can be established that the r.h.s. of (18) is continuous and strictly decreasing in m.F u r t h e r -
more, the r.h.s. is strictly positive for m =0 , and becomes negative for m suﬃciently large.14
Hence, there exists a unique threshold quality m, implicitly deﬁn e db ye q u a t i o n( 1 8 ) .
14As m →∞ , the term in brackets remains bounded, while the second term on the r.h.s. tends to −∞.An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 12
Endogenous cross-country diﬀerences in the distribution of ﬁrm eﬃciencies. The equilib-
rium assignment of entrepreneurs to varieties and the equilibrium location of production have
important consequences for cross-country diﬀerences in the distribution of ﬁrm eﬃciencies.
In our framework, it is natural to deﬁne the intrinsic eﬃciency of a ﬁrm of type (a,m,i) by
ϕ(a,m,i)=am since the ﬁrm’s gross proﬁt is proportional to am.T h i sd e ﬁnition of intrinsic
eﬃciency controls for wage (and technology) diﬀerences across countries.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the eﬃciency distribution of ﬁrms producing in country 2 ﬁrst-
order stochastically dominates that of ﬁrms producing in country 1.
Proof. See appendix.
This result follows from two observations. First, in equilibrium, the production of all of
the most popular varieties will be located in country 2. Second, in equilibrium, a variety of
any given mass appeal m will be managed by a more able entrepreneur in country 2 than in
country 1, a2(m) >a 1(m) for m<m. Hence, it is not only the endogenous change in the
location of production that causes aggregate eﬃciency diﬀerences between countries, but also
the re-assignment of entrepreneurs to varieties through the market for corporate assets. The
proposition shows that the empirical research on the sources of comparative advantage needs
to take the “selection eﬀect” of FDI into account.
4F o r e i g n D i r e c t I n v e s t m e n t
In the previous section, we derived the equilibrium assignment of entrepreneurs to varieties and
the equilibrium location of production. What still needs to be analyzed is the implied equilib-
rium pattern of trade and FDI. In this section, we interpret the assignment of entrepreneurs to
varieties and the location of production in terms of choice of FDI mode. We then present two
key results. First, all greenﬁeld FDI is one-way: from the high cost to the low cost country,
while cross-border acquisitions occur in both directions. Second, in the limit as factor price
diﬀerences between countries vanish, all FDI takes the form of cross-border acquisitions.
Types of FDI. In our model, the identity of a ﬁrm is linked to its entrepreneur. In this
sense, it will be the entrepreneurs that buy or sell varieties, rather than the reverse. Greenﬁeld
FDI from country i to country j occurs whenever an entrepreneur from country i relocates
production of a variety from country i to country j by building a new plant in country j.C r o s s -
border acquisition from country i to country j occurs whenever an entrepreneur from country
i purchases a variety from country j, independently of where this variety will be produced.
Two types of cross-border acquisitions are possible, dependent on whether the acquired variety
will be produced in its country of origin, or whether local production will be closed down and
transferred to the entrepreneur’s home country.
Equilibrium selection. Both the assignment of entrepreneurial types to types of varieties and
the location of production by mass appeal of variety are uniquely pinned down in equilibrium.
However, in the absence of any mobility costs for entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs of any given
ability but originating in diﬀerent countries are perfect substitutes. Consequently, there is
indeterminacy in the equilibrium gross ﬂows of FDI. Since the assumption of no frictions inAn Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 13
the market for cross-border acquisitions may be viewed as a limiting case where such frictions
become small, we henceforth conﬁne attention to the equilibrium pattern of FDI that minimizes
the volume of cross-border acquisitions.
Composition of international commerce. We are now in the position to provide a ﬁrst
characterization of FDI ﬂows. Since all varieties originating in country 2 are produced in that
country, any greenﬁeld FDI must be one-way, namely from country 1 to country 2. Any variety
of mass appeal m>m that originated in country 1 will be produced in country 2. This
relocation of production may be accomplished in two ways: (i) an entrepreneur from country
1 may engage in greenﬁeld FDI in country 2 by building a new plant in that country, or (ii) an
entrepreneur from country 2 may purchase that variety, close down production in country 1,
and build a new plant in country 2. Since we restrict attention to the equilibrium pattern of
FDI that minimizes the volume of cross-border acquisitions, the latter will occur only if there
is an insuﬃcient number of entrepreneurs of ability a1(m) originating in country 1 to manage
production of varieties of mass appeal m from their home country. In contrast, all varieties of
mass appeal m<m from country 1, and all varieties from country 2, will be locally produced.
These varieties will be acquired by a local entrepreneur of ability ai(m),o re l s ei ft h el o c a l
supply of such entrepreneurs is too small, by a foreign entrepreneur.
More formally, let ψi(m) denote the ratio between the number of entrepreneurs, originating
in country i, who in equilibrium will be assigned to a variety of mass appeal m, and the number
of varieties of that mass appeal originating in the same country. If ψi(m) < 1, then a fraction
1 − ψi(m) of these varieties must be acquired by foreign ﬁrms (entrepreneurs). A variety of
mass appeal m from country i will be managed by an entrepreneur of ability ai(m),a n ds o
ψi(m)= l i m
∆→0
Ei [Gi(ai(m + ∆)) − Gi(ai(m))]


















































Observe that both functions ψ1 and ψ2 are continuous, except that ψ1 has a discontinuity at m,
while ψ2 exhibits discontinuities at θm and m. Note also that the value of ψi(m) depends di-
rectly on the relative supply of ﬁrms in country i, Ei/(E1+E2), factor price diﬀerences, as sum-
marized by θ, and the relative supply of managerial abilities in country i, gi(ai(m))/g(ai(m));
it also depends on the assignment function ai(m), provided there are cross-country diﬀerences
in the distributions of entrepreneurial abilities, i.e., gi 6= g.An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 14
Using the functions ψ1 and ψ2, we can derive aggregate statistics of FDI ﬂows. Let γi and
µi denote the fractions of entrepreneurs (ﬁrms) from country i who will engage in greenﬁeld
FDI and cross-border acquisitions, respectively. Since all greenﬁeld FDI is directed toward the





since a fraction min{ψ1(m),1} of a variety of mass appeal m>m originating in country 1
will be produced in country 2 as part of greenﬁeld FDI (while the remaining fraction max{1−
ψ1(m),0} will be acquired and relocated by entrepreneurs from country 2).






max{1 − ψ2(m),0}dH(m). (22)
To see this, note that if ψ2(m) < 1,t h e r ei sa ni n s u ﬃcient number of entrepreneurs from
country 2 that have the “right” ability to manage production of varieties with mass appeal m







max{1 − ψ1(m),0}dH(m). (23)
We can now make two important observations. First, the ﬂows of cross-border acquisitions
will be balanced in equilibrium,
E1µ1 = E2µ2.
Balancedness obtains since, in each country, the mass of entrepreneurs is equal to the mass
of varieties, both before the merger market opens as well as after the merger market closes.
Moreover, each greenﬁeld investment involves one entrepreneur and one variety from the same
country. Second, all entrepreneurs from country 1 who are of ability a ∈ (a2(θm),a 2(m)) will
be engaged in cross-border acquisitions in country 2, and so µ1 =( E2/E1)µ2 > 0.
We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, greenﬁeld FDI and cross-border acquisitions co-exist. All green-
ﬁeld FDI is one-way: from country 1 to country 2, but not in the reverse direction. In contrast,
cross-border acquisitions are two-way: from country 1 to country 2, and from country 2 to
country 1.
Existing models of vertical FDI (e.g., Helpman, 1984) predict that, at any given production
stage, all FDI ﬂows are one-way: the only receiving country is the one that has a comparative
advantage in that stage of production. Yet, there is overwhelming empirical evidence showing
that FDI ﬂows are generally two-way. In light of this stylized fact, trade theorists have relied
on models with transport costs to generate two-way FDI. As proposition 2 shows, transport
costs are not necessary to generate this stylized fact.An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 15
There is ample evidence that many governments are wary of foreign acquisitions of domestic
establishments that result in the closure of local production. Our model can indeed generate





which is positive if and only if g1(a) <g 2(a) for some a>a 2(m). Interestingly, if foreign
acquisitions result in the closure of local production, they involve the more popular varieties
(of mass appeal m>m) from country 1.
Vanishing factor price diﬀerences. As ﬁgure 2 has revealed, cross-border acquisitions are
the dominant mode of FDI between the richest and most developed countries (where, arguably,
factor price diﬀerences are not very large). In contrast, a much larger fraction of FDI ﬂows
from the rich and developed countries to the poor and developing countries (where, arguably,
factor price diﬀerences play an important role) involve greenﬁeld.
To explain these ﬁndings within our model, we analyze the composition of FDI in the limit
as factor price diﬀerences become small, i.e., as θ → 1. An immediate observation is that the
quality threshold m →∞as θ → 1.15 Consequently, greenﬁeld FDI disappears as factor price





as θ → 1.
However, generically, we have g2(a) 6= g(a) for (almost) any a. Hence, µ1 and µ2 are bounded
away from zero, even as θ → 1. We therefore obtain the following key result.
Proposition 3 There always exist cross-border acquisitions in both directions, independently
of factor price diﬀerences. In contrast, greenﬁeld FDI disappears in the limit as factor price
diﬀerences vanish. Hence, as θ → 1, all FDI takes the form of cross-border acquisitions.
What this propositions highlights is that there are two reasons for cross-border acquisitions,
but only one reason for the existence of greenﬁeld FDI. In our model, greenﬁeld FDI occurs
only because ﬁrms want to exploit factor price diﬀerences by relocating production from a high
cost to a low cost location. In contrast, cross-border acquisitions not only exist because of
factor price diﬀerences, but also because the distribution of entrepreneurial abilities (or, more
generally, of ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets) varies from one country to another.16
More generally, the following features of our model are necessary to obtain two-way cross-
border acquisitions in the absence of factor price diﬀerences: there must be heterogeneity in
both types of corporate assets (entrepreneurial abilities and the mass appeal of varieties), and
these corporate assets must be complementary, and there must be distributional diﬀerences
across countries in at least one of the two types of corporate assets. This highlights the
importance of “two-sided” heterogeneity in our assignment model.
15To see this, suppose otherwise that m is bounded from above, independently of θ. But then, the r.h.s. of
equation (18) is strictly positive for θ suﬃciently close to one, while the l.h.s. is identical to zero; a contradiction.
16This may be reminiscent of Grossman and Maggi (2000), where trade between countries occurs because of
diﬀerences in the distributions of workers’ talent.An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 16
5F i r m E ﬃciency and Choice of FDI Mode
In this section, we further explore the mapping from a ﬁrm’s eﬃciency to its choice of FDI mode.
For this purpose, we impose additional structure on the distributions of entrepreneurial abilities.
We then obtain another key result: ﬁrms that engage in greenﬁeld FDI are systematically more
eﬃcient than those that engage in cross-border acquisitions. Moreover, we show that, under
some modest regularity condition on the distribution of varieties’ mass appeal, the probability
that an entrepreneur from country 1 engages in FDI is weakly increasing in the entrepreneur’s
ability.
Eﬃciency diﬀerences: greenﬁeld FDI vs. cross-border acquisitions. As ﬁgure 1 has revealed,
U.S. ﬁrms engaging in greenﬁeld FDI are systematically more eﬃcient than U.S. ﬁrms engaging
in cross-border acquisitions. Our model generates this result under a variety of distributional
assumptions. A natural restriction on the distribution of entrepreneurial abilities that allows
us to obtain this result is the following symmetry condition.
(C1) The distributions of entrepreneurial abilities are the same in both countries: G1 ≡ G2.
Given this symmetry in entrepreneurial abilities across countries, all FDI is motivated
by factor price diﬀerences. As can be seen from equations (19) and (20), (C1) implies that
ψ1(m)=ψ2(m)=1for all m ≥ m. Hence, all cross-border acquisitions involve varieties
of mass appeal m<m,w h i l ea l lg r e e n ﬁeld FDI still involves only varieties of mass appeal
m>m. Positive assortative matching between a and m in each country then implies the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 Firm engaging in greenﬁeld FDI are more eﬃcient than ﬁrms engaging in
cross-border acquisitions.
If we were to relax the symmetry condition (C1), we would still obtain that ﬁrms engaging in
greenﬁeld FDI are, on average,m o r ee ﬃcient than ﬁrms engaging in cross-border acquisitions.
To see this, note that, even in the absence of (C1) greenﬁeld FDI involves only entrepreneurs of
abilities exceeding a2(m) and varieties of mass appeal exceeding m, while cross-border acquisi-
tions are the only FDI mode associated with less able entrepreneurs and less popular varieties.
To violate our weaker prediction, one would thus need a very strong departure from symmetry,
namely that one country has a much larger supply of the very best entrepreneurs than another.
Through the lens of this proposition, it may become apparent why the governments of many
host countries appear to favor greenﬁeld FDI over cross-border acquisitions. Policymakers may
perceive two important diﬀerences between the two FDI modes. First, greenﬁeld FDI involves
the creation of new plants. Second, greenﬁeld FDI involves the best foreign ﬁrms, and therefore
a large number of workers.
Eﬃciency diﬀerences: cross-border acquisitions vs. domestic production. To further tighten
our predictions on the eﬃciency diﬀerences between ﬁrms engaging in diﬀerent modes of serving
t h ew o r l dm a r k e t ,w ei m p o s eam i l dr e g u l a r i t yc o ndition on the distribution of varieties’ mass
appeal.An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 17
(C2) The elasticity of the density function h,
mh0(m)
h(m)
is strictly decreasing in m.
I tc a ne a s i l yb ev e r i ﬁed that condition (C2) is satisﬁed by a number of standard distribu-
tions, e.g., by the two-parameter family of Weibull distributions, H(m)=1−e−(m/β)α
, α>0,
β>0 (which includes the exponential distribution as a special case with α =1 )a n dt h e
two-parameter family of Gamma distributions (which includes the chi-squared distribution as
a special case). Henceforth, we will assume that both distributional conditions, (C1) and (C2),
hold.
(C1) implies that ψ1(0) < 1 <ψ 2(0). Moreover, (C1) and (C2) imply that ψ1(·) is strictly
increasing on [0,m],a n dψ2(·) is strictly decreasing on [0,θm), has a downward jump at θm,
and is constant on [θm,m]. It will prove useful to deﬁne a second threshold mass appeal, b m.




1 (1) if limm↑m ψ1(m) > 1,
m otherwise.
(24)
Using this threshold b m and equations (21) to (23), we can summarize the relationship between
ﬁrm eﬃciency and FDI mode choice as follows.
Proposition 5 Consider the mapping from entrepreneurial ability to mode of FDI. For entre-
preneurs of ability a<a 2(θb m)=a1(b m), all FDI involves cross-border acquisitions in country 1.
For entrepreneurs of ability a ∈ (a2(θb m),a 2 (m)), all FDI involves cross-border acquisitions in
country 2. For entrepreneurs of ability a>a 2 (m), all FDI involves greenﬁeld FDI in country
2.
Consider an entrepreneur of ability a from country 1. (i) If a ≤ a1(b m)=a2(θb m),h ew i l l
not engage in FDI. (ii) If a ∈ (a2(θb m),a 2(θm)), the entrepreneur will, with positive probability,
acquire a variety in country 2. The probability that a country-2 variety of mass appeal m ∈
(θb m,θm) will be acquired by a foreign entrepreneur is 1−ψ2(m) ≥ 0, and is strictly increasing
in m. Positive assortative matching between a and m then implies that the probability that a
country-1 entrepreneur of ability a ∈ (a2(θb m),a 2(θm)) engages in cross-border acquisitions is
strictly increasing in a. (iii) If a>a 1(m)=a2(θm), the entrepreneur will engage in FDI with
probability one, namely in cross-border acquisitions if a ∈ (a2(θm),a 2(m)), and in greenﬁeld
FDI if a>a 2(m).
We thus obtain the following monotonicity result.
Proposition 6 The probability that an entrepreneur from country 1 engages in FDI is weakly
increasing in his ability a.
Proposition 6 implies, in particular, that in the high-cost country, ﬁrms engaging in cross-
border acquisitions are, on average, more eﬃcient than ﬁrms producing domestically.An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 18
6 Comparative Statics
In this section, we further explore the workings of our model. We generate a number of
additional predictions by analyzing the eﬀects of changing various exogenous variables on the
equilibrium assignment and location of production, and the aggregate statistics of FDI.
Throughout this section, we assume that conditions (C1) and (C2) hold. Using equations







[H(b m) − H(θb m)], (25)
and
γ1 =1− H(m). (26)
The ﬁxed cost of building a plant. We now want to explore the eﬀects of changing the ﬁxed
cost φ of building a new plant in country 2. Intuitively, one would expect that an increase
in φ raises the threshold m, and hence reduces the share γ1 of entrepreneurs from country 1
engaging in greenﬁeld FDI in country 2. Indeed, this can easily be established using equation
(18). Further, m → 0 as φ becomes small, and m →∞as φ becomes large. Next, note that
if b m<m, b m is implicitly deﬁned by θh(θb m)/h(b m)=1 , and hence (locally) independent of φ;
otherwise b m = m,a n ds ob m is strictly increasing in φ.W et h u sh a v et h ef o l l o w i n gl e m m a .
Lemma 1 The threshold m is strictly increasing in φ, m → 0 as φ → 0,a n dm →∞as
φ →∞ .F u r t h e r ,i fb m<m,t h e nb m is (locally) independent of φ. Hence, there exists a unique
b φ>0 such that b m<m for all φ>b φ,a n db m = m for all φ ≤ b φ.
Since m is strictly increasing in φ, it follows immediately from equation (26) that the
fraction γ1 of entrepreneurs from country 1 engaging in greenﬁeld FDI is decreasing in φ.T h e
eﬀect of φ on the cross-border acquisition volume, however, depends on whether or not φ>b φ,
as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 7 A small increase in the ﬁxed cost φ of building a plant, dφ > 0, has the
following eﬀects:





> 0 if φ<b φ
=0 otherwise.
Proof. See appendix.
This proposition shows that the total number of cross-border acquisitions can be indepen-
dent of the cost and volume of greenﬁeld FDI, namely whenever the ﬁxed cost φ is suﬃciently
large (and the volume of greenﬁeld FDI small). However, even in this case, the composition of
cross-border acquisitions from country 1 to country 2 is not independent of φ in the sense that
a change in φ aﬀects the set of entrepreneurs from country 1 who will engage in cross-border
mergers.
Country characteristics. We now want to investigate the eﬀects on the equilibrium of
varying country characteristics: the factor price diﬀerential, as measured by θ, and the numbersAn Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 19
of entrepreneurs in each country, E1 and E2. For simplicity, we will conﬁne attention to the
case φ>b φ.
Consider ﬁrst an increase in θ, i.e., a reduction in the factor price diﬀerence between the two
countries. Under condition (C1), FDI is ultimately driven by factor price diﬀerences. Hence,
one would expect the volume of FDI to decrease as the countries become more similar. Indeed,
this intuition is correct, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 8 A reduction in the factor price diﬀerence between the two countries, dθ > 0,
has the following eﬀects:





Consider now a small decrease in the number of entrants in country 2, E2,h o l d i n gt h e
total number of entrants in the two countries, E1 + E2, ﬁxed. That is, the aggregate mass of
varieties and entrepreneurs is held constant, while varieties and entrepreneurs from country 2
are becoming relatively more scarce. We obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 9 A small decrease in the number of entrants in country 2, E2, holding the total
number of entrants, E1 + E2, ﬁxed, has the following eﬀects:
dγ1 > 0 and dµ1 = −dµ2 < 0.
Proof. See appendix.
Intuitively, a relative decrease in the number of entrants in country 2 implies that there are
fewer attractive corporate assets in country 2 that entrepreneurs from country 1 can acquire.
Hence, as E2/(E1 + E2) decreases, entrepreneurs from country 1 will substitute away from
cross-border acquisitions in favor of greenﬁeld FDI. This eﬀect is reinforced by the indirect
eﬀect through the markup-adjusted residual demand level: the shift in endowments in favor of
the high-cost country raises S, which further increases the incentive for ﬁrms from the high-
cost country to engage in greenﬁeld FDI. In the limit as the relative number of entrants from
country 2 goes to zero, all FDI from country 1 to country 2 will be in the form of greenﬁeld
FDI, i.e., µ1 → 0,w h i l eγ1 is bounded away from zero. This is an alternative explanation
for the observation (summarized by ﬁgure 2) that U.S. MNEs are much more likely to choose
greenﬁeld FDI when engaging in FDI in poor, developing countries (where, arguably, there are
fewer attractive target ﬁrms) than when engaging in FDI in rich, developed countries.
A small decrease in the fraction of entrants who originate in country 2 makes the countries
“more similar” if E1 <E 2, and “more dissimilar” if the reverse inequality holds. An interesting
question is whether the aggregate number of cross-border acquisitions, E1µ1 +E2µ2,i n c r e a s e s
or decreases as the two countries become more similar. From equations (22) and (23), we have
E1µ1 + E2µ2 =
2E1E2
E1 + E2
[H(b m) − H(θb m)].
Recall that b m is independent of the number of entrants. Hence, the aggregate volume of cross-
border acquisitions follows a gravity-type equation: it increases as the two countries become
more similar in terms of their populations of entrants.An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 20
Corollary 1 Consider a small increase in the number of entrants in country 1, E1, holding the
total number of entrants, E1 + E2, ﬁxed. Then, the aggregate number of cross-border mergers,
E1µ1 +E2µ2,i n c r e a s e si fE1 <E 2,a n dd e c r e a s e si fE1 >E 2. Hence, the aggregate number of
cross-border mergers is maximized when E1 = E2.
Does the aggregate volume of cross-border acquisitions increase or decrease as the two
countries become more similar? As proposition 8 and corollary 1 show, the answer depends on
which set of country characteristics one considers. As countries become more similar in terms of
production costs, the aggregate two-way volume of cross-border acquisitions decreases, whereas
the opposite result obtains as countries become more similar in terms of their populations of
entrants.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have developed an assignment theory to analyze both the volume of for-
eign direct investment and its composition between cross-border acquisitions and greenﬁeld
investment. In our model, a ﬁrm consists of a bundle of heterogeneous and complementary
corporate assets. The merger market allows ﬁrms to trade these corporate assets to exploit
complementarities. A cross-border acquisition involves purchasing foreign corporate assets,
while greenﬁeld FDI involves building production capacity in the foreign country to allow the
ﬁrm to deploys its corporate assets abroad. Equilibrium in the merger market is the solution
to the associated assignment problem.
There are two countries that can freely trade with one another. Factor price diﬀerences
between countries give rise to greenﬁeld FDI and to cross-border acquisitions, while cross-
country diﬀerences in entrepreneurial abilities give rise only to cross-border acquisitions. In
equilibrium, greenﬁeld FDI is always one way: from the high-cost to the low-cost country,
while cross-border acquisitions are always two-way. Hence, our model can generate two-way
FDI ﬂows even in the absence of transport costs and factor price diﬀerences.
Firms’ choice between the two modes of FDI, and the re-assignment of corporate assets on
the international merger market have an important impact on aggregate productivity. While
FDI may positively aﬀect the distribution of ﬁrm eﬃciencies in one country, it may have the
opposite eﬀect in the other country. Indeed, if productivity is measured at the plant level,
cross-border acquisitions tend to reduce the observed productivity of the plants in the high-
cost country.
We have derived the following key predictions. (1) Firms engaging in greenﬁeld FDI are
systematically more eﬃcient than those engaging in cross-border acquisition. As we have shown,
this is consistent with the data. (2) As factor price diﬀerences between countries vanish, all FDI
takes the form of cross-border acquisitions. This prediction is consistent with our observation
that U.S. multinationals are more likely to favor cross-border acquisitions over greenﬁeld FDI in
high-wage rather than low-wage countries. (3) As the relative supply of corporate assets in the
low-wage country decreases, ﬁrms in the high-wage country substitute away from cross-border
acquisitions in favor of greenﬁeld FDI. Again, this is consistent with our observation that theAn Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 21
share of cross-border acquisition in total U.S. FDI is decreasing in the host country’s level of
development.
While outside the scope of this paper, our model may also fruitfully be used as a framework
for policy analysis. For instance, it would be interesting to compute the welfare implications of
various policy experiments, such as restrictions on cross-border acquisitions or greenﬁeld FDI.
From the host country’s point of view, cross-border acquisitions involve a change in ownership
of local production (and may even lead to the closure of local production), while greenﬁeld
FDI involves the opening of a new establishment. In this sense, cross-border acquisitions bring
“less” to the host country’s economy than greenﬁeld FDI. Moreover, greenﬁeld FDI involves
better foreign ﬁrms than cross-border acquisitions. Hence, the optimal government policy
toward foreign direct investment should be tailored to the particular mode of FDI: greenﬁeld
FDI vs. cross-border acquisitions. We believe this to be an exciting avenue for future research.An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 22
Appendix: Empirics
This appendix serves two purposes. First, we explain the data used to construct ﬁgures 1 and
2. Second, we present an econometric analysis of the composition of a U.S. multinational’s
mode choice as a function of ﬁrm and country characteristics.
Our ﬁrm-level data come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), which each year
conducts a mandatory survey of all U.S. ﬁrms with foreign aﬃliates above a certain size thresh-
old. (The size threshold ensures that the dataset does not contain “empty shells”, i.e., legal
entities without employees.) Firms that come to own a new enterprise abroad are required to
report (i) whether that enterprise was obtained through cross-border acquisition or greenﬁeld
FDI, (ii) in which industry that enterprise produces, and (iii) in which country that enterprise
is located. From this database, we collected every recorded investment by those multinationals
whose mainline of business is a traded good over the ﬁve-year period 1994-1998. The BEA
dataset also contains a wide range of data on the characteristics of the parent ﬁrms that are
conducting FDI abroad, which are used as explanatory variables in our analysis.
Construction of ﬁgures 1 and 2. Our two measures of a ﬁrm’s eﬃciency are (i) the logarithm
of sales of the U.S. parent ﬁrm in the United States (USSALE), and by (ii) the logarithm of
the parent ﬁrm’s value-added per employee (VADDPW ). In order to sort ﬁrms in diﬀerent
industries into eﬃciency groups, we must make eﬃciency data comparable across industries.
Using data for 1994, we calculate the diﬀerence between the eﬃciency of ﬁrm i in industry k and
the industry k average, and normalize this diﬀerence by the standard deviation in eﬃciency
across ﬁrms in industry k. On the basis of relative eﬃciency, we sort ﬁrms into the three
equally-sized groups, aggregate investment counts over ﬁrms within a group, and calculate the
share of investments taking the form of cross-border acquisitions by eﬃciency group.
To construct the data in ﬁgure 2, countries are sorted into three equally-sized groups on
the basis of their real GDP per capita in 1994, and on the basis of the average wage paid
by multinationals in that country in 1994. These data come from the Summers and Heston
dataset and the Bureau of Economic Analysis, respectively.
Econometric model. To assess the robustness of the relationships shown in ﬁgures 1 and 2,
we estimate a logit model that relates a ﬁrm’s mode choice across countries and industries to
a variety of ﬁrm and country characteristics. The dependent variables takes the value of one
if the ﬁrm chooses cross-border acquisition, and zero otherwise. The key explanatory variables
are the two measures of ﬁrm eﬃciency described above (USSALES and VADDPW )a n dt h e
host country’s level of development. In addition to including a variety of ﬁrm and country
control variables, we also control for ﬁxed eﬀects by parent industry.
In the construction of our sample, we classiﬁed investments to facilitate interpretation of
the results. In particular, we aggregated a ﬁrm’s investments over the sample period 1994-1998
so that, for each ﬁrm, a country-industry pair appears at most once. For ﬁrms that made
more than one investment in a particular country and industry, a country-industry observation
for a ﬁrm was coded as a cross-border acquisition only if all investments made over the ﬁve-
year period in that country-industry cell were cross-border acquisitions, and was coded as a
greenﬁeld investment otherwise.17 To ensure comparability across ﬁrms, the 1994 value of each
17Almost all industry-country pairs were either entirely characterized by cross-border acquisition or greenﬁeld.An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 23
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Description
ACQ 0.435 0.496 Indicator for Acquisition
USSALE 15.2 1.61 Sales in U.S.
VA DDPW 4.45 0.523 (Gross Product)/Employees
EMP 10.0 1.44 Employees
DIV -1.01 0.658 Herﬁndahl Index for Parent Firm Sales
R&D -.389 1.32 (R&D Expenditure)/Sales
EXP 0.696 0.460 Indicator for Previous Country Experience
INTRAIM 0.610 0.336 (Intra-Firm Imports)/(Total Imports)
RGDPPC 9.81 0.723 Real GDP per Capita
AV WAGE 3.1 0.75 Average Wage
POP 16.7 1.38 Population
OPEN 3.94 0.648 (Exports plus Imports)/GDP
All continuous variables (except INTRAIM) in logarithms.
All ﬁrm data is from the BEA’s conﬁdential dataset.
Country level data is from the Penn World Tables.
parent ﬁrm’s characteristic is used to predict that ﬁrm’s investment behavior over the whole
ﬁve-year period.
We consider six speciﬁcations. In three of these speciﬁcations, our measure of ﬁrm eﬃciency
is USSALES. In the other three, we measure ﬁrm eﬃciency using VADDPW and control for
ﬁrm size using EMP, the number of workers employed by the parent.18 We include four ﬁrm-
level controls. First, we include RDSALE, which is the logarithm of a ﬁrm’s R&D expenditures
to its total sales. Second, we include DIV,w h i c hi sam e a s u r eo faﬁrm’s diversiﬁcation across
industries.19 Third, to quantify a parent ﬁrm’s previous experience in a foreign country, we
include an indicator variable, EXP, which is equal to one if the parent ﬁr mo w n e da ne n t e r p r i s e
in that country prior to the sample period, and is zero otherwise. Fourth, we include the variable
INTRAIM, which is the ratio of a parent ﬁrm’s intra-ﬁrm imports to total imports so as to
measure the extent of the ﬁrm’s international vertical integration. In all six speciﬁcations, we
include measures of three country characteristics: a host country’s level of development, its
market size, and its degree of openness to international trade. To gauge a host country’s level
Only a handful of country-industry pairs in the sample involved both cross-border acquisitions and greenﬁeld
FDI. The results that obtain from estimating the same model on the raw data oﬀer very similar results.
18The correlation between USSALES and VADDPW is 0.46.










where spj is the share of the parent ﬁrm’s sales in industry j, and the sum is over the eight largest industries in
which the parent ﬁrm sells.An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 24
of development in a parsimonious fashion, we include RGDPPC, which is the logarithm of real
GDP per capita. A country’s market size is captured by POP, which is the logarithm of the
country’s population. Finally, we include OPEN, which is a measure of a country’s openness to
international trade (the sum of exports and imports, divided by GDP). Descriptive statistics
are presented in table 1.
The results are shown in table 2, where the heading of each column indicates the measure of
productivity used in that speciﬁcation. The columns are organized by the number of controls
included in the analysis with the ﬁrst two corresponding to the most parsimonious speciﬁca-
tions, the next two corresponding to speciﬁcations including the ﬁrm level controls, and the
last two corresponding to speciﬁcation that also include ﬁxed eﬀects by aﬃliate industry. All
six speciﬁcations include parent industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors (shown in parentheses)
are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering by ﬁrm.
The results provide evidence that the relationships reported in ﬁgures 1 and 2 are robust to a
wide range of ﬁrm and industry controls. In all six speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcient on the eﬃciency
measure is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that the more eﬃcient ﬁrms enter
foreign markets through greenﬁeld FDI rather than through cross-border acquisition. Firms
do not perceive cross-border acquisitions and greenﬁeld FDI as perfect substitutes.20 Further,
in all six speciﬁcations the coeﬃcient on RGDPPW is positive and statistically signiﬁcant,
indicating that ﬁrms tend to enter rich, developed countries through cross-border acquisition
rather than through greenﬁeld FDI.
20Our empirical results complement those of Blonigen (1997), who provides indirect evidence suggesting that
greenﬁeld FDI and cross-border acquisitions are diﬀerent in nature.An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 25
Table 2: Greenﬁeld FDI vs. Cross-Border Acquisitions as a Function of Firm and Country
Characteristics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
USSALE VADDPW USSALE VADDPW USSALE VADDPW
Eﬃciency -0.211 -0.932 -0.280 -1.128 -0.301 -1.287
(0.074) (0.308) (0.103) (0.374) (0.122) (0.504)
EMP -0.141 -0.111 -0.077
(0.076) (0.115) (0.167)
DIV -0.026 -0.298 -0.431 -0.766
(0.317) (0.317) (0.412) (0.437)
R&D 0.038 0.099 0.009 0.068
(0.127) (0.143) (0.170) (0.196)
EXP 0.187 0.190 0.539 0.542
(0.243) (0.244) (0.282) (0.281)
INTRAIM -0.306 -0.569 -0.783 -1.062
(0.459) (0.487) (0.617) (0.663)
RGDPPC 0.662 0.613 0.564 0.533 0.550 0.502
(0.156) (0.154) (0.175) (0.173) (0.214) (0.219)
POP 0.037 0.057 0.004 0.015 -0.134 -0.120
(0.092) (0.097) (0.100) (0.103) (0.124) (0.124)
OPEN -0.626 -0.551 -0.591 -0.573 -0.947 -0.918
(0.185) (0.189) (0.202) (0.207) (0.280) (0.284)
FE: Parent Y E SY E SY E SY E SY E SY E S
Industry
FE: Aﬃliate NO NO NO NO YES YES
Industry
Obs. 856 849 724 725 641 642
Log-likelihood -488 -480 -412 -407 -305 -302
Standard errors (shown in parenthesis) are robust to heteroskedasticity and allow for clustering by parent ﬁrm.
The correlation between USSALE and V ADDPW is 0.46.
The eﬃciency measure corresponding to each speciﬁcation is shown under the column number.An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 26
Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 . Let λi(ϕ) denote the fraction of ﬁrms producing in country i that
are of eﬃciency less than or equal to ϕ. We need to show that λ1(ϕ) >λ 2(ϕ) for all ϕ>0.
For ϕ ≥ ma1(m),w eh a v e
λ1(ϕ)=1>λ 2(ϕ).
Consider now 0 <ϕ<ma1(m),a n dl e tmi(ϕ) be such that ϕ = mi(ϕ)ai(mi(ϕ)), i.e., mi(ϕ) is
the mass appeal of the variety that will, in equilibrium, be produced by a ﬁrm of eﬃciency ϕ









E2 + E1 [1 − H(m)]
≡ λ2(ϕ),
where the second inequality follows from the observation that m1(ϕ) >m 2(ϕ).
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n7 . An increase in φ induces an increase in the threshold m (see lemma
1), which in turn leads to an increase in γ1 (see equation (26)).
Consider now the eﬀect of an increase of φ on µi.L e tϕ(m) ≡ h(m)−θh(θm). Further, let
e m be deﬁned by ϕ(e m)=0 .T os e et h a te m is unique, note that
ϕ0(e m)=h0(e m) − θ2h0(θe m).
Further,
h0(e m) <θ 2h0(θe m)






since h(e m)=θh(θe m). However, the last inequality must hold by condition (C2). Hence,
ϕ0(e m) < 0,a n ds oϕ(m) > 0 for any m<e m,a n dϕ(m) < 0 for any m>e m.
From (19) and (24), we have b m =m i n {e m,m}.I fφ ≥ b φ,t h e nb m = e m, and so an increase in
φ has no eﬀect on b m, and hence (by equation (25)) no eﬀect on µi.I fφ<b φ,t h e nb m = m<e m.
From lemma 1, it follows that a small increase in φ leads to an increase in m. Using equation
(25) and the implicit function theorem, an increase in m induces an increase in µi if ϕ(m) ≡
h(m) − θh(θm) > 0. However, since m<e m if φ<b φ, it follows indeed that ϕ(m) > 0.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n8 . We ﬁrst want to show that m is increasing in θ.L e tϕ(θ,m) denote
the r.h.s. of equation (18). Since ∂ϕ(θ,m)/∂m<0, we need to show that ∂ϕ(θ,m)/∂θ > 0.An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 27



















































Hence, dm/dθ > 0. From (26), it then follows immediately that dγ1/dθ < 0.
Consider now the share µ1 of entrepreneurs from country 1 who engage in cross-border


























b mh(θb m) < 0.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n9 . Observe that the eﬀect of an decrease in E2, holding E1+E2 ﬁxed,
is equivalent to the eﬀect of increasing E1, holding E1+E2 ﬁxed. Hence, we need to prove that
dγ1/dE1 > 0 and dµ1/dE1 < 0. To this end, we ﬁrst show that m is decreasing in E1, holding
E1 + E2 ﬁxed. Let ϕ(E1,m) denote the r.h.s. of equation (18). Since ∂ϕ(E1,m)/∂m<0,w eAn Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment 28
need to show that ∂ϕ(E1,m)|E1+E2=const./∂E1 > 0. From (18), we obtain
∂ϕ(E1,m)
∂E1



































¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
E1+E2=const.
dm.



































Integrating by parts yields
θm[H(m) − H(θm)]a2(θm) − θ
Z m
0
a2(θm){[H(m) − H(θm)] + m[h(m) − θh(θm)]}dm
−θm[H(m) − H(θm)]a2(θm) −
Z m
θm


















where the equality follows again from integrating by parts. Substituting this expression for the
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which is clearly negative. From (26), it then follows that γ1 is increasing in E1, holding E1+E2
ﬁxed.




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
E1+E2=const.
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